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Abstract—A malicious attacker could, by taking control of
internet-of-things devices, use them to capture received signal
strength (RSS) measurements and perform surveillance on a
person’s vital signs, activities, audio in their environment, and
other RF sensing capabilities. This paper considers an attacker
who looks for periodic changes in the RSS in order to surveil a
person’s breathing rate. The challenge to the attacker is that a
person’s breathing causes a low amplitude change in RSS, and
RSS is typically quantized with a significantly larger step size.
This paper contributes a lower bound on an attacker’s breathing
monitoring performance as a function of the RSS step size and
sampling frequency so that a designer can understand their
relationship. Our bound considers the little-known and counter-
intuitive fact that an adversary can improve their sinusoidal
parameter estimates by making some devices transmit to add
interference power into the RSS measurements. We demon-
strate this capability experimentally. As we show, for typical
transceivers, the RSS surveillance attack can monitor RSS with
remarkable accuracy. New mitigation strategies will be required
to prevent RSS surveillance attacks.
Index Terms—Received signal strength, respiratory rate mon-
itoring, privacy of personal health information
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet-of-things (IoT) devices are notoriously easy to
compromise [1]–[3]. Given that devices bring sensors like mi-
crophones and cameras into our private spaces [4], people are
rightfully concerned for their privacy. People know what kind
of information an attacker could obtain from compromising a
video camera in their private spaces, and may not deploy them
[5] or may physically disable them [4]. In contrast, there is
little awareness of what an attacker could obtain from a device
which can measure received signal strength (RSS). Yet, every
wireless device could be an RF sensor.
RF sensors have been shown to be capable of monitoring
breathing and heart rate [6], location [7], [8], activity [9],
gesture [10], audio [11], and keystrokes [12]. Many of these
demonstrations have used channel state information (CSI)
which can only be obtained from a select group of WiFi
network interface cards (NICs). From the designer’s perspec-
tive, an attack using CSI can be negated by avoiding these
NICs. However, wireless devices universally allow access to
RSS information since network functions such as multiple
access control and power control [13]–[15] require it. Thus,
in this paper, we address the most universal problem: the
capabilities of an attacker who compromises a wireless device
to access RSS measurements and surveil a person near that
device. The use of RSS measurements for sensing is also
not new, as they have been used to perform contact-free
breathing monitoring [16], [17], device-free localization [18],
and gesture and activity recognition [19]. However, the extent
to which an attacker could perform any RF sensing task using
RSS is still an open question, one which motivates this paper.
Our purpose is to address the question, what is the best
that an attacker could possibly do? Knowing an attacker’s
limits can provide a guarantee to a user, that even if the
device is completely compromised by an attacker, its ability
has a particular quantitative limit. Furthermore, if these limits
are known as a function of transceiver parameters, then a
transceiver designer can adapt the design to reduce an at-
tacker’s capabilities.
Quantization and Interference: Quantization is good news
for security against an attacker with access to RSS. A well-
known limitation of RSS is that it is quantized, typically with
1 dB step size (although sometimes 0.5 dB or 4 dB). For the
above sensing applications, typical changes to received power
are much less than 1 dB (e.g., 0.1 dB in [20]) unless the user
is very close to the transceivers. Fig. 1(Top row) shows what
often happens—the received power is affected by a person
breathing at 15 breaths per minute (bpm), but the quantized
RSS is constant.
However, the bad news we discover in this investigation
is that an attacker’s capabilities are greater than previously
thought because the attacker can exploit what we call help-
ful interference (HI). HI is the purposeful transmission of
interference from other devices to increase the variance of
the RSS measurement at a receiver. An attacker could use
other compromised devices to transmit, perhaps with carrier
sense disabled, to generate HI. Counterintuitively, this increase
in measurement variance prior to quantization can actually
improve the attacker’s estimates of frequency and amplitude,
partially negating the effects of quantization. Fig. 1(Bottom
row) shows an example of how noise from an interferer helps
to sometimes “push” the quantized RSS over the boundary
to the next RSS value, thus making the breathing rate ob-
servable. We provide the first experimental demonstration, to
Fig. 1: Received power (Left column) and RSS quantized to the nearest integer (Right column), while a person breathes at
15 bpm. (Top row) Without interference, RSS is constant, but (Bottom row) with interference the RSS crosses to the higher
value at least once per period, enabling estimation of breathing rate.
our knowledge, of the ability to use interference to improve
the performance of an RSS-based breathing rate estimator.
Our experimental observations with varying levels of helpful
interference also exhibit an optimal level of HI. The estimation
bounds presented in this paper take into account an attacker’s
ability to use HI, and also show that there is an optimal
level of HI beyond which performance degrades. The resulting
variance bounds are a function of the transceiver’s RSS quan-
tization step size and sampling rate. Device makers can use
this bound to limit the inadvertent measurement capabilities
of attackers by the design of their device, and we provide
strategies for this purpose in this paper.
Breathing Monitoring: We pay particular attention to RSS-
based breathing monitoring in this paper, as it has already
been demonstrated [21]. We believe it is important to know
the relationship between breathing rate estimation performance
and quantization step size and RSS sampling rate, which can
be computed from the bound in this paper. Further, RSS
breathing rate is private health information. Resting heart and
breathing rates are measures of cardiovascular health. During
sleep, such data is used to classify sleep stage and thus sleep
quality. Vital sign data is useful for knowing emotional state.
Typically a person would not want an employer or an insurance
company to have such data. Together with other data, breathing
rate can help to classify a person’s activities, including in
private spaces like bedrooms.
Contribution Summary: We summarize the contributions of
this paper as follows:
1) This paper is the first to quantify and experimentally
validate the use of helpful interference, in this case, for
breathing monitoring.
2) This paper provides a lower bound on frequency rate
and amplitude estimation, and applies it to provide quan-
titative results, for RSS-based breathing monitoring. In
particular, we find the lower bound on the variance of
any unbiased estimator of frequency or amplitude of a
sinusoid in the RSS signal, using Crame´r-Rao bound
(CRB) analysis.
3) Based on the CRB results, we also provide a set of
strategies that a transceiver designer can use for providing
RSS in a way that prevents accurate breathing rate
eavesdropping.
In combination, these contributions provide quantitative limits
on the effectiveness of an attacker who compromises wireless
devices and uses them as RF sensors.
II. THREAT MODEL
We assume an area in which a person is located in a
home with two or more transmitters and receivers. When the
environment is otherwise static, periodic motion caused by the
person, for example, due to breathing and pulse, cause changes
in the radio channel that can be observed at the receivers as
variations in the received power, and indirectly in RSS, which
is the quantized received power.
We assume that an attacker can access the transmitters and
receivers in the home, and that they can alter device firmware
or software to force transmitters to transmit more often and
receivers to receive (and collect RSS measurements) more
often, up to the maximum rate and maximum RSS precision as
possible with the receiver hardware. Since wireless standards
(e.g, 802.11) require higher layer access to signal strength
[22], an attacker can use this information maliciously for RSS
surveillance. This attack model is practical as it has been
shown that there are millions of vulnerable and unprotected
Internet connected devices deployed today, and attackers have
repeatedly managed to remotely take over such devices and
install botnets on them [2], [3] or make modifications to
the software/firmware [23]. Furthermore, we assume that an
attacker can force a transmitter to transmit in the same
frequency band at the same time as the other transmitter (e.g.,
by disabling carrier sensing [24], [25], using a hidden terminal)
in order to contribute noise to the receiver, as described in §III.
The attacker can either transfer the measurements to another
processor or process the measurements locally on the same de-
vice. We do not assume any computational or communication
constraints for the attacker. We make no assumption about the
algorithm used except that it is unbiased, e.g., the attacker
does not always guess the same breathing rate regardless of
the data.
We do not consider an adversary that brings their own
wireless devices to the home. While an attacker who brings
a software-defined radio (SDR) to a home might be able
to monitor a resident with greater accuracy, this would re-
quire physical proximity to each home to be attacked and
considerable cost for each SDR. In contrast, the attack we
study requires only remote access to the already installed but
compromised commercial wireless devices, and thus could be
launched without new hardware and on a very large scale.
III. BACKGROUND
With the increasing density of wireless interfaces in our
private spaces which grant users and applications direct access
to RSS measurements, and the variety of abilities of RF
sensing, we anticipate RSS-based “surveillance” as a potential
threat to privacy. In the following subsections, we discuss
existing methods for RSS-based respiration monitoring, briefly
describing reported algorithms for breathing rate estimation.
A. RSS Extraction and Pre-processing
Most existing wireless technologies, such as WiFi and Zig-
bee, provide direct access to RSS information. In IEEE 802.11
implementations, one may use RSS readings to measure the
relative signal power level of the preamble of each received
802.11 frame. To measure RSS, an adversarial user could pas-
sively listen for transmitted frames or initiate packet reception
by continuously pinging a nearby device. In most existing
operating systems, RSS is read with a single command. Many
smart phone applications access WiFi signal strength, and
there are few limits on software access to RSS measurements.
After collection, further processing is typically performed.
Filtering is used to remove the DC component and any high-
frequency noise, neither of which is informative for breathing
rate estimation. Specifically, for breathing monitoring results
in this paper, we use: 1) a DC removal filter applied to each
30-second window RSS measurements, and 2) a 4th order
Butterworth lowpass filter with a cutoff frequency of 0.5 Hz.
We show in Fig. 2 RSS data recorded from a subject lying
on a cot and breathing at 15 bpm. After the DC removal
filtering is applied to the RSS measurement, one can see about
seven and half cycles over 30 seconds, which corresponds to
a breathing rate of 15 bpm.
B. Respiratory Rate Estimation
Fig. 2: RSS pre-processing by DC removal & filtering
Next, the pre-processed RSS data is used to estimate breath-
ing rate. There are various methods proposed for frequency
estimation, such as zero-crossing detection, Fourier transform
maximum selection, linear predictive coding, and least-squares
harmonic analysis [17], [26]. We apply a maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE) as it provides generally unbiased and efficient
estimation. The MLE algorithm finds the peak frequency fˆ in
the power spectral density (PSD) within the respiratory rate
range [fmin, fmax]. As shown in Fig. 3, the peak frequency fˆ
of the PSD matches the actual breathing rate.
The amplitude of the breathing-induced signal is also useful.
It can be applied in breathing detection or to find a breathing
person, e.g., in a collapsed building. One algorithm is to use
the amplitude of the PSD at the breathing frequency fˆ .
Fig. 3: MLE of breathing rate for data in Fig. 2
IV. BREATHING SURVEILLANCE WITH HELPFUL
INTERFERENCE
In this section, we describe and demonstrate RSS-based
breathing surveillance with helpful interference. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to introduce the use of helpful
interference, that is, transmitting interference to overcome the
limitation of RSS quantization in estimating breathing rate.
A. Devices and Setup
For our evaluation, we desire a commercial wireless
transceiver, but we need control over the quantization step size
and sampling rate. We achieve this goal by using a commercial
wireless transceiver, the TI CC1200. The CC1200 radio is
used as integral part of some commercial internet-of-things
(IOT) products like the zoul module [27] and it has been
shown to measure received power without quantization [20].
We then can apply any quantizer to the received power in post-
processing to emulate the RSS that would have been reported
using an arbitrary transceiver RSS quantization step size.
We use CC1200 transceivers configured as transmitter,
receiver and interferer nodes respectively. The transceivers
are configured to operate over a less congested ISM band
at 868/915 MHz to have a better control on the level of
interference in the channel. While we believe that uncon-
trolled interference could also benefit breathing monitoring, we
control our interference source for purposes of understanding
the relationship between interference power and monitoring
performance. For simplicity, the transmitter sends a continuous
wave signal at a transmit power of 12 dBm. The receiver node
uses the average of the squared magnitude of the complex
baseband (IQ) samples to compute the received power, and
outputs a received power measurement at a rate of 615 Hz. The
third transceiver is programmed to generate HI. We implement
a 2-FSK transmitter with a symbol rate of 256 Kbps in
the same band, and transmit random symbols. To study the
effect of the magnitude of interference, we also control the
output power of the interferer by modifying the value of the
PA_CFG1 register on the CC1200 transceiver.
The experiments are conducted in a laboratory setting in
a university building. We run the experiments with three
CC1200 transceivers operating as a transmitter and a receiver,
and a helpful interference transmitter (HI TX). Fig. 4 shows
one setup used in this experiment. All experiments are per-
formed with a single user lying on a cot. The subject inhales
and exhales at a fixed rate given by a metronome.
We use root mean squared error (RMSE) as error metric to
evaluate the breathing monitoring performance.
B. Helpful Interference
First, we evaluate the effect of increasing interference power
on breathing rate estimation using quantized RSS measure-
ments. In Fig. 5, we show how RSS changes in the presence
of increasing interference. With no interference at the start of
the experiment, the measured RSS almost always takes the
value of -54 dBm. As a result, it is largely unable to estimate
breathing rate, and the breathing rate RMSE is about 15 bpm.
Each 151 seconds, the HI power is increased by by changing
the value of the PA_CFG1 register on the interfer radio, as
shown in red in the bottom of Fig. 5. As the interferer’s
power increases, the samples of quantized RSS begin to
take two different RSS values, both -54 and -53 dBm. The
probability of -54 (and -53) changes as a function of whether
the person is inhaling or exhaling. This then allows estimating
the periodicity of the signal. This is shown to enhance the
Fig. 4: Experiment Setup
accuracy of breathing rate estimation by lowering the RMSE of
breathing rate estimation from 15 bpm to 2 bpm. For the given
data, we also note that increasing the power of the interference
beyond a certain point, will not improve accuracy below 2 bpm
of RMSE.
V. BOUNDS FOR RSS SURVEILLANCE
The previous section provides experimental evidence of
the possible benefits of HI, which an attacker can exploit
to improve performance when RSS is quantized. While the
experimental results provide examples of what an attacker
could achieve, they do not provide any guarantees about the
best performance an attacker could achieve. In this section,
we provide analytical limits on the attacker’s eavesdropping
capability. These limits consider that an attacker may use
HI, and are a function of the system parameters of available
RSS sampling rate and quantization step size, as well as
the amplitude of the breathing signal being surveilled by
the attacker. As before, we use the variance of breathing
rate estimates as an example. Note however that the bound
is generally applicable to any RF sensing application which
estimates the amplitude or frequency of a sinusoidal signal
component. We compute the theoretical lower bounds on
estimation variance using Crame´r-Rao bound analysis.
The bounds on variance provide guarantees that are useful to
both users and RFIC system designers. First, note that one can
never guarantee that an attacker cannot estimate breathing rate
at all — an attacker can always estimate breathing rate to be 15
bpm, for example, without any RSS data, but this would not be
a useful attack. We focus on bounding the lowest possible vari-
ance of an attacker’s unbiased breathing rate estimate since,
if this variance is high, it effectively shows that the attacker
is unable to gain meaningful information about the person’s
breathing rate. A user could use such a bound to decide if
an attacker who compromises the device could effectively
estimate their breathing rate or not. An RFIC designer could
alter the parameters of the RSS measurements made available
Fig. 5: As HI power gain increases each 151s, the breathing rate error decreases to a minimum of 2 bpm.
from the chip to increase the variance bound and thus make
their device more acceptable to privacy-conscious customers.
A. RSS Model for Breathing
In order to derive the theoretical bounds on breathing
eavesdropping, we first model the received power including the
variation due to breathing. Published work has demonstrated
the validity of modelling of the breathing-induced component
in the received power as a sine wave [28]. Thus, we assume
that a person’s breathing changes the measured signal as an
additive sinusoidal component. Here we again use received
power to indicate the continuous-valued power of the signal at
the antenna, and RSS to indicate the quantized discrete-valued
power reported by the transceiver IC. Although generally
an eavesdropper may take burst measurements, we assume
a scalar time-dependant signal for simplicity. We use B to
denote the received power when breathing is absent, and v(k)
to denote the noise in sample k, which is assumed to be zero-
mean white Gaussian noise with variance σ2 [29]. Therefore,
the sampled received power signal is given as
x[k] = A cos (ωTsk + φ) +B + v[k], k ∈ Z, (1)
where Ts is the sampling period, and the breathing signal
has unknown amplitude A, DC offset B, frequency ω, and
the initial phase φ. The unknown parameter vector is θ =
[A,B, ω, φ]T .
Our model is that the received power is quantized with a
step size of ∆. Typically ∆ ≫ A, that is, the step size is
significantly larger than the changes in RSS due to breathing.
Eexperimental work has indicated peak-to-peak amplitudes of
the breathing signal to be, for example, 0.1 dB [20], or 0.3
dB [30]. Pulse-induced amplitudes are even smaller. It is rare
to see transceiver RSS to be quantized to less than 0.5 dB,
as typical step sizes are 1.0 dB or higher. Since A is low
compared to ∆, during breathing monitoring, the (quantized)
RSS measurement typically takes one of two neighboring
values. It follows that we can approximate the RSS signal
as a one-bit quantization of the received power x[k]. Note this
approximation is not imperative for obtaining an estimation
bound, since multi-bit CRB analysis of frequency analysis is
possible [31]. When ∆≫ A, that more complicated bound is
nearly identical to the bound we derive, but the complexity can
obscure the lessons learned from the bound with the one-bit
quantization assumption.
Assuming one-bit quantization, the RSS is represented as:
y[k] = sign (x[k]− ζ) , (2)
where ζ is the threshold for quantization (the boundary be-
tween the two RSS bins) and the sign function sign(·) is
defined as sign(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0 and sign(x) = −1 for
x < 0. Without loss of generality, we assume ζ = 0. The DC
offset B becomes the distance from the nearest quantization
threshold and takes a value in the set [−∆/2,∆/2]. We define
y = [y[0], . . . , y[N − 1]]T to be our measurement vector.
The attacker’s goal is to estimate A and ω from these RSS
measurements y. While rate is most frequently discussed in
breathing monitoring, the amplitude A is also useful as it may
indicate breathing volume [32], which then may indicate the
person’s level of activities or stress level. It is also a useful
parameter in detecting the presence of a breathing person near
a link.
B. Crame´r-Rao Bound (CRB) Analysis
Here, we compute the Crame´r-Rao bound of the parameter
vector θ given the measurements y. First we define the
probability mass function corresponding to kth sample y[k]
as
fy[k] = P (y[k] = q; θ), q ∈ {−1,+1}.
If we define Ck := cos(ωTsk + φ) and Sk := sin(ωTsk + φ),
then
fy[k](q; θ) = P (y[k] = q; θ) = P (qx[k] > 0; θ)
=
1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− [x− q(ACk +B)]
2
2σ2
)
dx.
Equivalently,
fy[k](q; θ) =
1
2
erfc
(
− q√
2σ
(ACk +B)
)
. (3)
To compute the CRB, we first derive the Fisher information
matrix (FIM). From [33], the element of the FIM from ith
row and jth column is given by
I(θ)ij = E
[
∂ log fy(q; θ)
∂θi
∂ log fy(q; θ)
∂θj
]
(4)
Since the variables y[k] are independent, the element of the
FIM from ith row and jth column becomes:
I(θ)ij =
N−1∑
k=0
∑
q=±1
1
fy[k](q; θ)
∂fy[k](q; θ)
∂θi
∂fy[k](q; θ)
∂θj
(5)
We compute the partial derivatives for the parameters θ, plug
them into (5), and the resulting FIM becomes:
I(θ) =
2
piσ2
N−1∑
k=0
exp
(
− 1
σ2
(ACk +B)2
)
1− erf2
(
1√
2σ
(ACk +B)
)Fk, (6)
where
Fk =


C2k Ck −AkTsSkCk −ASkCk
Ck 1 −AkTsSk −ASk
−AkTsSkCk −AkTsSk A2k2T 2s S2k A2kTsS2k
−ASkCk −ASk A2kTsS2k A2S2k

 .
In this analysis, we focus on finding the bounds on variance
of unbiased amplitude (Aˆ) and frequency (ωˆ) estimators,
which are given in the inverse of the FIM in (6) as
CRB(Aˆ) =
{
I(θ)−1
}
11
,
CRB(ωˆ) =
{
I(θ)−1
}
33
.
(7)
For a quantization step size ∆, the DC offset B can be
represented as a uniform random variable defined over the
interval [−∆/2,∆/2]. In addition, each bound is a weak
function of the initial phase φ which is also random and
uniform for our applications. Thus we average the CRB over
uniform phase and uniform DC offset. We use CRB to indicate
the CRB averaged over a uniform phase φ and uniform
DC offset B. Therefore, the variance of amplitude estimates
var(Aˆ) and the variance of frequency estimates var(ωˆ) are
bounded by CRB(Aˆ) and CRB(ωˆ) respectively.
var(Aˆ) ≥ CRB(Aˆ)
var(ωˆ) ≥ CRB(ωˆ). (8)
In subsequent subsections, we study the accuracy of breath-
ing eavesdropping based on estimation variance computed in
(8). In particular, we analyze the effects of quantization step
size ∆, interference σ and sampling rate fs .
C. Effects of Helpful Interference
We study the effect of adding noise to RSS measurements
prior to quantization for both amplitude and frequency estima-
tion. For this analysis, we consider a value of frequency of f =
15 bpm, i.e., 0.25 Hz, which is a typical resting breathing rate
for a normal adult. Further, we consider a sampling rate fs =
10 Hz. We set N , the number of samples, such that NTs = 30
s, and we choose an amplitude A = 0.1 dB.
We plot numerical results in Fig. 6 for the bound on the
standard deviation of amplitude estimates as a function noise
standard deviation as computed from (8). We note that as
the noise power increases, the bound on standard deviation
of amplitude estimate generally decreases for quantized RSS
measurements. Intuitively, this is because, as the sine wave
is more likely further away from the threshold, even at its
maxima or minima, estimation accuracy requires higher noise
power in order to ensure that the measurements are not
purely from one quantization level. For quantized RSS, small
interference power results in higher estimation variance as
the quantized RSS measurements have a lower probability of
changing their RSS levels with small noise power.
This effect is similarly observed in frequency estimation.
Fig. 6(right column) shows the effects of increasing noise
power to RSS prior to quantization on the accuracy of breath-
ing rate estimation. We see that increasing the noise level
decreases the estimation variance for quantized RSS measure-
ments. These results indicate that adding HI to a wireless
channel improves the accuracy of amplitude and frequency
estimations from quantized RSS measurements. They also
match the characteristics observed experimentally in §IV.
It is also worthwhile to see the effect of adding noise when
the signal is not quantized. We see the bound for Aˆ from
[34], is var(Aˆ) ≥ 2σ2/N , which indicates that the standard
deviation increases with noise power for unquantized RSS
measurements. Similarily, we see that increasing the noise
level increases the estimation variance of frequency estimates
for unquantized RSS measurements.
Optimum Noise Variance: A key observation from the results
is that the bound on estimation variance using quantized
measurements has a minimum value with respect to noise
power for a given sampling rate and quantization step size.
We note from Fig. 6 that there exists an optimal noise
level at which estimation variance is brought to its minimum
for a given sampling rate and RSS quantization step size.
Our numerical results show that the optimal noise level for
amplitude estimation matches that for frequency estimation. In
Fig. 8, we observe that the standard deviation of this optimal
noise is linearly proportional to the RSS quantization step size,
and that σopt is approximately∆/4. Interestingly, this standard
deviation of helpful interference is just less than the standard
deviation of quantization error, which is ∆/
√
12 = ∆/3.46.
It should be noted that the bound on standard deviation
of ωˆ is a weak function of the frequency parameter ω, and
thus the plot is omitted. However, the amplitude significantly
affect the performance of frequency estimation; as shown in
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Fig. 6: CRB of (Left column) amplitude A and (Right column) frequency ω, vs. noise power when fs = 10 Hz. As noise
power increases, the estimation variance decreases and then slowly increases.
Fig. 7, higher amplitude results in lower standard deviation of
frequency estimates.
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Fig. 7: Effect of amplitude on frequency estimation
D. Effects of Quantization Step Size
An other parameter that controls the performance of breath-
ing eavesdropping is the quantization step size ∆.
We can see that the accuracy of breathing eavesdropping,
despite the ability of the attacker to use helpful interference,
can be generally be degraded by increasing the RSS quantiza-
tion step size. Furthermore, the minimum estimation bounds
for amplitude and frequency estimates behave differently with
respect to the RSS quantization step size. In Fig. 8(bottom),
we observe that the bound for frequency estimates increases
linearly with RSS quantization step size whereas the bound
for amplitude estimate fits a quadratic model with respect to
the step size.
E. Effects of RSS Oversampling
Next, we evaluate the effects of sampling rate on the
accuracy breathing monitoring, particularly in breathing rate
estimation. We use ω = 1.55 rad/s which corresponds to f =
0
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0.25 Hz = 15 bpm, and A = 0.1 dB. In Fig. 9(Left column),
we plot the bound on standard deviation of amplitude estimate
as a function of the sampling rate fs. This bound decreases
monotonically with fs for any value of the quantization step
size ∆. The lowest fs in Fig. 9(Left column) is 1 Hz. This
suggests that an eavesdropper attains lower estimation variance
by collecting RSS at higher rate. If it is possible to increase
the sampling rate, the bound shows the possibility of order-of-
magnitude decreases in standard deviation. Similar results are
observed for frequency estimation where increasing sampling
rate decreases the bound on standard deviation of frequency
estimates.
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Fig. 9: CRB of (Left column) amplitude A and (Right column) frequency ω, as a function of sampling rate when σ = 0.7 dB.
As sampling rate fs increases, the estimation variance decreases.
F. Overall Effects
Our CRB analysis shows that the accuracy of RSS-based
surveillance can be controlled mainly by two parameters:
RSS quantization step size and sampling rate at which the
RSS measurement is collected. We numerically analyze the
combined effect of oversampling and quantization on RSS-
based breathing monitoring. Fig. 10(Left column) shows the
minimum theoretically achievable standard deviations of am-
plitude and frequency estimates as functions of quantization
step size ∆ and RSS sampling rate fs. We note from these
plots that lower estimation variance is generally attained with
higher sampling rate and low step size. On the other hand,
lower sampling rate and high step size lead to large estimation
variance and hence lower accuracy in breathing surveillance.
These results suggest the accuracy of an RSS-based breathing
surveillance attack can be controlled by a designer by selecting
a large RSS step size and low sampling rate.
VI. MITIGATION
The numerical results from the bound analysis presented in
Section V are, frankly, quite discouraging. Existing wireless
systems generally provide access to the RSS at a rate of up to
1000s of times per second, and at quantization step sizes as low
as 0.5 dB. Even with two orders of magnitude lower sampling
rate, and a quantization step size of 2 dB, such devices, if
compromised, would enable an attacker to know breathing rate
within a standard deviation of just under 1 breath per minute.
In other words, they are inherently vulnerable to RSS-based
breathing surveillance.
Clearly, there is a need to design systems that limit RSS
information in new ways. In this section, we present a group
of mitigation strategies that could be used by system devel-
opers and RFIC designers to make their devices more secure
against an RSS-based surveillance attack, without significantly
compromising the performance of wireless systems.
Less RSS Information: Ideally, RSS-based eavesdropping
can be deterred by limiting access to RSS information from the
RFIC with low sampling rate and very large quantization step
size. However, this approach may be impractical because the
effectiveness of almost any mobile wireless protocol depends
on accurate RSS information. If we are unable to access RSS,
we cannot use power control to reduce energy consumption
and limit interference, for example.
Never Provide Both: A more realistic recommendation
would be that the transceiver IC could be limited to prevent
both high rate and low step size RSS measurements as
follows. In this scheme, applications which require accurate
RSS are provided with high resolution RSS at a low rate,
while applications demanding RSS at a high rate would be
allowed RSS only with large quantization step size. Only one
application could be active at a time, and there would be a
long switching time whenever the setting was switched. In
Fig. 10, we see theoretically minimum deviation for breathing
rate estimated from RSS measurements, as a function of RSS
step size and sampling rate. Normally, clinical-grade breathing
monitors have an accuracy of breathing rate within 1 bpm
[35]. Therefore, a privacy-aware system developer may want
the minimum standard deviation of breathing rate estimated
by eavesdropper to be 2 bpm. In this case, the developer
achieves this requirements by designing a wireless system with
a parameter pair of a sampling rate and RSS step size picked
anywhere above the 2 bpm curve in Fig. 10, for example, at
20 Hz with a step size of 8 dB. The low rate setting could
allow RSS at 4 Hz with a step size of 2 dB.
However, this may not be appropriate for mobile communi-
cations devices with tight transmit power control requirements.
For example, 4G and other code-division multiple (CDMA)
systems are limited by the near-far problem, which for mobile
devices requires a few hundred Hz of power control updates.
This high rate is due to the high rate at which the mobile chan-
nel may be changing. For this application 1 dB, equivalently
25% of the power in linear terms, is a significant step size for
CDMA receivers; and as a result low step size is required.
Adaptive Rate Scheme: For such applications, we suggest
an adaptive rate RSS reporting mechanism in which applica-
tions are granted high quality RSS at very high rate only when
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Fig. 10: Contour plot of minimum CRB for (Left column) amplitude and (Right column) frequency estimates vs. sampling
rate and quantization level.
the wireless channel is changing rapidly. When the channel is
nearly constant, new RSS measurements are provided only
at a low rate, e.g., less than 0.25 Hz. Note that when the
channel is changing rapidly, it is either due to the mobility
of the endpoints of the link, or fast motion of people near
the link. In either case, breathing is largely unable to be
estimated with mobile endpoints or with fast human motion
in the vicinity of the link [36]. Thus we do not anticipate
breathing monitoring being possible from devices with this
adaptive rate RSS scheme.
Adaptive Quantization Scheme: We observe that when
the offset B (distance from the average RSS to the near-
est quantization threshold) is large, breathing monitoring is
most difficult. We can ensure that B is large by changing
the quantization boundaries. In this scheme, we would have
two quantization functions with the same step size ∆. For
example the first quantization scheme would have boundaries
{RSS0 + n∆} for some lowest threshold RSS0 and non-
negative integers n = 0, 1, . . ., while the 2nd quantization
scheme would have boundaries {RSS0 + (n+ 0.5)∆}. Each
period of time, e.g., 10 or 20 seconds, the quantization
scheme would be re-selected to maximize B. Since A ≪ B,
during periods of time when RSS could be used for breathing
monitoring, since B was large, there would primarily be only
one value of RSS reported for long periods of time. This
scheme might also be used in combination with either of the
previous two schemes.
VII. RELATED WORK
Radio Frequency Sensing: Radio Frequency sensing is the
use of radio channel measurements to monitor vital signs
or detect human activity without putting any sensor on the
body of a person. Various radio channel measurements such
as received signal strength (RSS), channel impulse response
(CIR), and channel state information (CSI) have been used
for multiple RF sensing applications including contact-free
vital sign monitoring [6], [21], device-free localization [37],
[38], gesture and activity recognition [9], [19], and human
identification [39].
Among several channel measurements employed in most
commercial wireless systems, RSS is considered to be the
most widely available measurement across diverse wireless
platforms [40]. RSS has been applied in various RF sensing
applications including device-free localization [18], contact-
free breathing monitoring [16], [21], security & surveillance
[41], activity and gesture recognition [20], [42], and home
monitoring [37].
The ease of access to RSS and its capability in RF sensing
allows a potential threat on privacy. Little attention has been
paid to these threats, mainly because RSS-based sensing has
been reported to have limited reliability as a result of its
relatively large quantization step size [20]. However, the limits
on the capability of RSS-based sensing has not been fully
explored. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate such an
unexplored RF sensing capability that uses noise superimposed
in RSS measurements to improve breathing monitoring.
Estimation Bounds: Estimation bounds are statistical tools
used to evaluate the performance of algorithms in estimating
certain parameters of interest with respect to the maximum
theoretically attainable accuracy, commonly based on their
estimation variance.
The Crame´r Rao lower bound is the most common variance
bound due to its simplicity [33]. It provides the lowest possible
estimation variance achieved by any unbiased estimator.
Evaluating the accuracy of algorithms used in RSS surveil-
lance is essential step to determine eavesdropper’s capabilities.
An analytical explanation for the relationship between noise
power, sampling rate, amplitude, quantization, and parameter
estimator performance has not been presented. The change
in RSS due to periodic activities like respiration can be
generally modelled as a sine wave [28]. For unquantized sine
wave signal, the CRB on the variance of unbiased frequency
estimators is derived in [33], [34]. However, RSS has a
signficantly higher quantization step size than the typical RSS
change induced by vital signs, each RSS sample primarily
falls into either of two successive RSS values. Høst-Madsen
et al. [43] quantitatively explain the effect of quantization
and sampling on frequency estimation of a one-bit quantized
complex sinusoid, but without presenting bounds for amplitude
estimation or considering a DC offset as a complicating
parameter. In this paper, we evaluate attacker’s bound on
breathing rate and amplitude estimation in the realistic case
that there is a DC offset. Further we have demonstrated what
is observed in the bound, that increased interference power
can actually help improve estimates.
Wireless Network Security: Security in wireless networks
is conventionally achieved through cryptographic protocols at
multiple layers in the network stack. In wireless local area net-
works including 802.11, a number of cryptographic protocols
have been standardized including IPSecurity, Wi-Fi Protected
Access (WPA), and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium, researchers have
proposed additional security protocols at the physical layer
to deter eavesdropping and jamming, such as by exploiting
channel characteristics [44], [45], employing coding schemes
[46], or controlling signal power [47], [48]. However, these
approaches do not prevent an adversary already with some
access to a system from using PHY layer signal measurements
for sensing purposes.
Such an adversary can also force a wireless device to
continuously transmit helpful interference in order to re-
duce the effect of quantization on the quality of the RSS
information. Most wireless standards use a multiple access
control method to avoid interference, such as carrier-sense
multiple access (CSMA). However, many RFICs (e.g., Atheros
AR9271) provide the option to disable CSMA and control the
random backoff timer [25]. These vulnerabilities pave the way
for the attacker to change a device’s software to create an
interferer operating on the same channel at the same time as
the receiver measuring RSS.
Despite considerable research effort for privacy, RSS
surveillance attack by exploiting measurements from wireless
systems has been unresolved problem. Banerjee et al. demon-
strate that an attacker can easily estimate artificial changes in
transmit power to detect and locate people through wall. In
[49], an third device is introduced to distort the PHY layer
signal before it could be used by eavesdropper for sensing
purposes, but fails for multiple-antenna eavesdropper or if a
device can be remotely compromised and caused to run the
attacker’s software.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Recent progress in RF sensing has demonstrated the ability
to re-purpose standard wireless devices for vital sign monitor-
ing. From the perspective of a privacy-conscious user, this can
be considered a significant threat. A person’s smart home, if
hacked, could provide an attacker constant track of their vital
signs, their mood and activities, and perhaps record them and
be able to guess what they’re typing. While it may be obvious
to a user that smart home sensors such as video cameras
are privacy risks, it may not be so obvious that standard
transceivers may also pose such risks.
From another perspective, the attack we present is more
readily addressed. By reducing access to RSS measurements
from the transceiver, perhaps by implementing one of the
schemes we describe in §VI, RFIC or SoC designers can make
transceivers which are unable to be useful in the described
breathing monitoring attack. The attack presented in [49]
cannot readily be prevented since attackers may bring to the
area their own devices with potentially unlimited measurement
capabilities. However, device manufacturers would need to be
convinced that consumers care about privacy from RF sensing
in order to want to change how their devices provide access
to RSS.
This paper uses breathing monitoring as the main example,
however, the same mathematical framework applies to the
surveillance of other periodic signals such as pulse rate. The
pulse-induced signal in received power usually has a lower
amplitude and higher frequency than the breathing-induced
signal [36]. As a result, mitigation strategies that prevent
remote breathing monitoring also protect privacy against pulse
rate monitoring.
Future work should study limits on the capability of
a surveillance attack on gestures and activities from RSS
measurements. In gesture, activity, and keystroke recogni-
tion, spectral and time-frequency measures are often used as
features input to machine learning algorithms [12]. Current
bound results on amplitude and frequency estimation could be
extended to study an attacker’s capability in RSS based gesture
and activity recognition.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explore the limits on RSS-based surveil-
lance attacks. We analyze the capability of such attacks in
estimating the sinusoidal parameters of low-amplitude sinu-
soidal signals by deriving the theoretical lower bound with
which an attacker could estimate the rate and amplitude of
a sinusoid. We show, both theoretically and experimentally,
that the adversary could force other wireless devices to
transmit simultaneously in order to improve their estimates.
The numerical values of the lower bound on variance show,
for typical RFICs, an RSS-surveillance attack could be very
accurate. We discuss, as a result, how a device designer could
limit the performance of a potential attack by adjusting the
quantization step size and the sampling rate. Most commercial
transceivers have fixed RSS quantization schemes, however,
a manufacturer could use adaptive quantization methods to
ensure that breathing monitoring attacks are ineffective.
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